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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the impact of client importance on auditor independence measured by ac-
crual earnings management and going-concern opinion. Our research sample consists of 1,080 
firm-years of observation from listed companies in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) with 
eight years of observation (2004-2011). With pooled OLS we found that client importance has a 
negative impact on accrual earnings management. We also found evidence that client importance 
has a positive impact on going-concern opinion. Collectively, our evidence suggests that although 
audit firms have economic dependence toward their clients, those audit firms can maintain their 
audit quality by keeping their independency toward their clients, reflected by the lower accrual 
earnings management and higher tendency of issuing going-concern opinion. Our results are ro-
bust by considering the results of our sensitivity tests that support the main results. 
 
Keywords: audit quality, auditor independence, client importance, earnings management, 
going-concern opinion 
 
Abstrak 
 
Penelitian ini menguji pengaruh kepentingan klien terhadap independensi auditor yang diukur 
dengan manajemen laba berbasis akrual dan opini going-concern. Sampel penelitian terdiri dari 
1.080 observasi dalam tahun-perusahaan dari perusahaan terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia 
(BEI) dengan delapan tahun pengamatan (2004-2011). Dengan menggunakan pooled OLS, kami 
menemukan bahwa kepentingan terhadap klien (client importance) berpengaruh negatif terhadap 
manajemen laba akrual. Kami juga menemukan bukti bahwa kepentingan terhadap klien 
berpengaruh positif terhadap opini going-concern. Secara keseluruhan, temuan-temuan kami 
menyimpulkan bahwa walaupun Kantor Akuntan Publik memiliki kepentingan ekonomi terhadap 
klien, namun Kantor Akuntan Publik memelihara kualitas audit dengan menjaga tingkat 
independensi terhadap klien mereka, tercermin dari manajemen laba akrual yang lebih rendah, 
dan terdapat kecenderungan yang lebih tinggi dalam memberikan opini going-concern. Hasil 
studi ini robust setelah mempertimbangkan hasil dari pengujian sensitivitas yang mendukung 
pengujian utamanya. 
 
Kata kunci:  kualitas audit, independensi auditor, kepentingan terhadap klien, manajemen laba, 
opini going-concern 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The audit quality of public accounting firms has 
been criticized in the last decade, since they 
could not protect the interests of investors (Cof-
fee 2002; 2003; Levitt 1998). This audit quality 
has been defined by various definitions. DeAn-
gelo (1981), for example, defines audit quality 
as the joint probability that the auditor will find 
a breach in the client's accounting system, and 
report that violation. In this definition, audit 
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quality covers the dimensions of competence 
and independence. Fitriany (2011) suggests that 
a higher degree of compentence from auditors is 
not always be accompanied by a higher degree 
of independence. In terms of independence, au-
dit quality can be measured from different as-
pects, i.e., economic dependence toward clients, 
the influence of client practices toward the pro-
pensity to meet earnings targets, corporate go-
vernance practices, the propensity to issue 
going-concern opinions, the conducted peer re-
view, or other measure of independence (Bamb-
er and Bamber 2009). 
Due to the auditor-client relationship, 
auditors may have incentives to compromise 
with their clients depending on the auditors’ 
economic interests on their clients (DeAngelo 
1981; Reynolds and Francis 2001). The prop-
osition that the auditors will report favorably 
to retain important clients is known as the 
economic bonding (DeAngelo 1981). The in-
dependence of auditors can be reflected in the 
extent to which auditors will tolerate opport u-
nistic earnings management, and how likely 
the auditors will issue going-concern opinion 
(Herusetya 2012; Francis and Yu, 2009). 
Most of prior studies found that eco-
nomic dependence does not encourage larger 
clients to perform greater discretions in ac-
crual-based earnings management (e.g., Rey-
nold and Francis 2001; Francis and Yu 2009; 
Herusetya 2012). Some previous studies found 
evidence that auditor independence impaired 
when clients pay for non-audit services is rela-
tively higher compared to the total fee (Frankel, 
Johnson and Nelson 2002). They found evi-
dence of a positive association between client 
importance (i.e., the ratio of non-audit services 
to total fee) and the amount of discretionary 
accruals. While Chung and Kallapur (2003) 
found no evidence on the association between 
client importance and abnormal accruals.  
Past research also found the associa-
tion between client importance and audit opi-
nion issued by public accounting firms (e.g., 
Reynolds and Francis 2001; Craswell, Stokes 
and Laughton 2002; Chen, Sun and Wu 2010). 
Reynolds and Francis (2001) found that Big 5 
did not treat larger clients with more compro-
mise than smaller clients based on the size of 
individual practice offices, i.e., by not reduc-
ing the propensity to issue going-concern opi-
nions. Existing financial incentives were con-
sidered enough to motivate the auditors to be 
independent, despite the fact that the presence 
of economic dependence relationships was 
inherently in the auditor-client contract. Simi-
larly, Craswell et al. (2002) found that fee de-
pendence as a threat to auditor independence 
does not affect the likelihood of auditors to 
issue qualified audit opinions, both at national 
and local market levels.  
The lack of evidence on the previous 
studies, which examined the associations be-
tween client importance, earnings manage-
ment, and going-concern opinion are the main 
reasons of our study. The lack of past research 
on auditor independence in Indonesia, as 
measured by the economic dependence of au-
ditors toward their clients will make some 
contributions to this study. First, Marchesi 
(2000) for example, found that audit quality in 
ASEAN countries was so compromise. But as 
the climate of audit environment in the United 
States has started to change since the corpo-
rate failure in 2001, which also gave impact to 
the legal and audit environment around the 
world including Indonesia
1
 (Fargler and Jiang 
2008; Chen et al. 2010), we expect to provide 
evidence on these associations. Secondly, past 
researches on audit quality were more domi-
nated by the measurement of the competence 
dimension, for example, using the size of ac-
counting firms (Big 4, etc) (Fitriany 2011; Si-
regar 2006; Francis 2004). Audit quality of the 
Big 4 firms in Indonesia may differ from the 
Big 4 firms in the United States who are under 
the Sarbanes Oxley Acts (Gordon et al. 2013). 
Our study contributes to the measurement of 
independence of the audit firms in Indonesia 
using a proxy of client importance which in-
cludes a sample of the Big 4 firms. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPO-
THESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Client Importance as a Measure of Auditor 
Independence 
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It was long been a suspicion that the auditors’ 
financial interest toward their clients can 
greatly affect the auditor independence (Mautz 
and Sharaf 1961 in Chen et al. 2010). DeAn-
gelo (1981) suggests that auditors’ incentives 
to compromise their independence toward 
their client depends on the importance of a 
client to the auditor (client importance), i.e. 
the ratio of quasi rents specific to the client 
divided by the total number of quasi rents re-
ceived by the auditor. 
DeAngelo (1981) observed that if the 
percentage of the entire fee depends on one 
client used as a measure of audit quality (i.e., 
perceived independence with respect to that 
client) then the audit quality will decrease. 
The proposition that auditors will report fa-
vorably to retain important clients is known as 
economic bonding (DeAngelo 1981; Francis 
and Yu 2009), fee dependence, or economic 
dependence (Reynolds and Francis, 2001; 
Chen et al. 2010). It is probable that the great-
er the size of the clients in auditor’s portfolio, 
the greater the incentive for the auditor to re-
tain his clients, in which audit quality is likely 
to be compromised (Chen et al. 2010).  
 
Client Importance and Earnings Management 
Since the corporate scandals involving audi-
tors in the United States by the end of 2001 
that gave birth to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) of 2002, the change of audit environ-
ment is also felt through over the world, in-
cluding Indonesia. The Indonesian Govern-
ment issued various regulations concerning 
the audit services provided by audit firms. 
These regulations were expected to increase 
the competence and the independence of the 
auditors (Herusetya 2012). 
Auditor independence can be reflected 
in the extent to which the auditor became 
more tolerant to the earnings management 
done by the clients. The higher the quality of 
the independence of the auditors, the lower the 
earnings management behavior was reflected. 
Previous research has examined the associa-
tion between client importance and earnings 
management (e.g., Herusetya 2012; Reynolds 
and Francis 2001; Frankel et al. 2002; Chung 
and Kallapur 2003; Francis and Yu 2009). 
Reynolds and Francis (2001) examined 
the association between client importance and 
audit outcome, i.e. total accruals and total dis-
cretionary accruals as measures of earnings 
quality. They suspect that the client impor-
tance (INFLUENCE variable) at the level of 
individual practice office can reduce auditor 
independence, but they found that Big 5 audi-
tors did not treat larger clients more compro-
misingly compared to smaller clients. 
With a sample of 6,568 U.S. firms-
years observations for the period 2003 to 
2005, Francis and Yu (2009) examined 
whether the larger offices of Big 4 auditors 
have higher audit quality. Using an INFLU-
ENCE variable as a measure of the auditor's 
incentives with respect to a fee-dependence 
and used as a control variable, they found that 
larger Big 4 practice offices have a negative 
association with absolute abnormal accruals. 
Herusetya (2012) in his study used a compo-
site measure of audit quality that covered the 
dimension of competence and independence, 
and client importance (CI) was one of the 
proxies used in the dimension of indepen-
dence. By using a single proxy of CI, he found 
that CI has a negative association with the ab-
solute discretionary accruals. 
In summary these findings conclude 
that even though the auditors have economic 
dependence on their clients, but the auditors 
do not encourage greater discretion in accrual-
based earnings management
2
. In other words, 
the auditors do not provide greater tolerance to 
earnings management behavior for their im-
portant clients
3
. Based on the arguments given 
above, the hypothesis to be tested is: 
H
1
: Client importance is negatively associated 
with earnings management. 
 
Client Importance and Going-Concern 
Opinion 
Auditor’s independence can be reflected in the 
propensity to issue going-concern opinion. 
Auditor independence will decline if the audi-
tor compromise not to report the financial 
condition of the clients related to going-
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concern problems, because the auditor has 
economic dependence to the client (DeAngelo 
1981; Reynold and Francis 2001). 
Previous research found evidence on 
the association of client importance and audit 
opinion issued by public accounting firms 
(Reynolds and Francis 2001; Craswell et al. 
2002; Chen et al. 2010)
4
. Reynolds and Fran-
cis (2001) found that Big 5 did not treat large 
clients with more compromise than the smaller 
clients. Reynolds and Francis (2001) found the 
size of individual practice offices of the Big 5 
did not reduce the propensity to issue going-
concern opinion. Existing financial incentives 
were considered enough to motivate the audi-
tor to be independent, despite the fact that the 
presence of economic dependence relation-
ships was inherently in the auditor and client 
contract. Similarly, Craswell et al. (2002) 
found that the fee dependence as a threat to 
auditor independence does not affect the like-
lihood of auditors to issue a qualified audit 
opinion, both at the national and local market 
levels.  
Chen et al. (2010) conducted a study in 
China, and found that the level of auditor in-
dependence increase in line with the im-
provement of legal and regulatory environ-
ment. Chen et al. (2010) found that after 2001, 
when the legal and regulatory environment 
began to grow well in China, the tendency for 
clients to receive modified audit opinion 
(MAO) is higher compared to the period be-
fore 2001 (i.e., 1995-2000) for client impor-
tance measured by individual auditors. Simi-
larly, Li (2009) found that after the period of 
SOX in the United States, higher audit fees 
and total audit fee ratio have a positive associ-
ation with the auditor's propensity to issue 
going-concern opinion. The findings of Li 
(2009) and Chen et al. (2010) provide addi-
tional evidence that in line with the improve-
ment of the institutional and regulatory cli-
mate, the tendency of auditors to compromise 
in audit quality seems to decrease, given the 
risks of litigations and penalties for auditors 
are higher than the economic incentives they 
earned. Based on the above arguments, the 
hypothesis will be tested is: 
H
2
: Client importance is positively associated 
with the propensity to issue going-concern 
Opinion 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Population and Sample 
Population of this research is all listed compa-
nies in IDX along the year 2004-2011. Sample 
selection is performed with the criteria as fol-
lows: a) Companies issued annual report each 
year, with the fiscal year ended at December 
31, starting from year 2004 to 2011. b) Com-
panies are fully operated from 2004 to 2011 
and not included new listing (IPO) companies 
from 2004 to 2011. c) Companies are never 
delisted from IDX, discontinued its activities 
as well as merger. d) The sample does not in-
clude financial industries due to the classifica-
tion of regulated industries (Balsam, Krishnan 
&Yang, 2003; Francis & Yu, 2009; Herma-
wan, 2009; Herusetya, 2012). 
Based on the sample criteria, we ob-
tained 135 final samples of company per year 
for 8 year-period (2004-2011), or 1,080 firm-
years of observation
5
 of pooled OLS data.  
 
Table 1: Sample Description 
Description Total 
Number of firm-years observation from listed companies at IDX for the  year 2004-2011 4,560 
Number of firm-years observation from financial industries (1,144) 
Total preliminary sample 3,416 
Number of firm-years observation from new listing and delisted companies in 2004-2011 (1,440) 
Number of firm-years observation with incomplete data in 2004-2011 (696) 
Number of firm-years observation that does not meet the minimal observations in each 
industry per year 
(200) 
Total final sample (firm-years) 1,080 
Total final sample (company) 135 
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Empirical Model 
Client Importance and Earnings Management 
Prior research used discretionary models to 
identify earnings management (Francis and 
Yu 2009; Reynolds and Francis 2001; Balsam 
et al. 2003). To test the association between 
client importance and accrual earnings man-
agement we use pooled-OLS of Model 1 as 
follows: 
ABSDAC
it
= 
0 
+ 
1 
CI
it
 + 
2 
SIZE
it
 + 
3 
CFO
it
 + 
4 
LEV
it
 +
5 
LOSS
it
 + 
6 
ABSTACC
it
 + 
7 
SGRW
it
 + 
it  
 ................................. Model 1 
 
Hypothesis H
1 
of this research can be formu-
lated in statistical form as follows:  
H
1
: 
1 
< 0; the expectation for each variable 
control is: 
2 
 0,
3 
< 0, 
4 
> 0, 
5 
< 0, 
6 
> 0, 
7 
> 0. All variables are defined as in Table 2. 
 
The main variable in Model 1 is CI, 
and the coefficient 
1
 is predicted negative and 
significant toward the absolute discretionary 
accruals (ABSDAC), which indicates that 
client importance has a negative association 
with accrual earnings management. 
 
Table 2: Variable Descriptions 
Model 1 and 2: 
 
ABSDAC = 
Absolute discretionary accruals scaled by lagged total assets, using Kothari et al. 
(2005) estimated model, computed cross sectionally each year for each industry 
GCO = 
Dummy variable for going-concern opinion, equal to 1 if the company receive 
going-concern opinion in the current year; and 0 otherwise 
CI = Client importance, as the ratio of audit firm’s economic dependence toward its client 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets 
CFO = Cash flow from operation of client i in year t scale by lagged total assets 
LEV = Leverage ratio, defined as total liabilities divided by total assets at year end t 
LOSS = Dummy variable for loss firm, 1 if firm i at year t report net loss; 0 otherwise 
ABSTACC = Absolute value of total accruals of client i in year t 
SGRW = Sales growth, defined as (sales t – sales t-1)/sales t-1 
PRIORGC = 
Dummy variable, 1 if firm i receives going-concern opinion in the last year financial 
statements; 0 otherwise 
CASH = Cash and cash equivalent  
LLOSS = Dummy variable for prior year loss, 1 if firm i report net loss in t-1; 0 otherwise 
Equation (1): 
TACC = 
Total accruals, defined as earnings before extraordinary items less cash flow from 
operation 
A = Total assets 
REV = Change in firm’s net revenue in year t 
AR = Change in firm’s account receivables in year t 
PPE = Property, plant and equipment 
ROA = Firm’s return on assets, defined as the ratio of net earnings deflated by total assets 

it
 = Residual errors 
Subscript i,t = Identification for firm i and year t 
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To control other factors that affect ab-
solute discretionary accruals, we include sev-
eral variables in Model 1. Clients with larger 
size (SIZE) has less discretionary accruals, 
due to larger clients have more resources to 
maintain the sustainability of the entity (Beck-
er, Defond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam, 
1998; Reynolds and Francis, 2001; Balsam et 
al. 2003). However, large companies have al-
so higher market pressure to meet analysts' 
expectations (Barton and Simko 2002), thus 
having greater opportunities to perform earn-
ings management (Tresnaningsih 2008). 
Therefore we do not predict the sign of SIZE 
coefficient. Higher level of sales would in-
crease accruals but will reduce operating cash 
flows (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995), 
thus we expect a negative sign for CFO coef-
ficient. Companies with the higher level of 
liabilities (LEV) have more incentives to deal 
with earnings management compared to the 
lower level of liabilities (Reynolds and Francis 
2001; Balsam et al. 2003), therefore leverage 
(LEV) is predicted to be positively related to 
ABSDAC. Dechow and Schrand (2004), and 
Francis and Yu (2009) found a negative asso-
ciation of the company with net loss toward its 
accruals quality, therefore LOSS coefficient is 
predicted negative. ABSTACC, the absolute 
value of total accruals scaled by total asets t-1 
is used to control the propensity to generate 
accruals, and is predicted to have positive rela-
tionship with ABSDAC (Balsam et al. 2003; 
Francis and Yu 2009). McNichols (2000), and 
Menon and William (2004) found evidence 
that sales growth has a positive association 
with abnormal accruals, due to high growth 
companies have higher discretionary accruals 
adjustment. We predict SGRW has a positive 
association with ABSDAC. 
 
Client Importance and Going-Concern Opinion 
Most prior research examined the propensity 
to issue going-concern opinion (e.g., Geiger, 
Raghunandan and Rama 2005; Reynolds and 
Francis 2001; Craswell et al. 2002; Francis 
and Yu 2009; Geiger and Rama 2006; Francis 
2004). To test hypothesis H
2
, we use logistic 
regression of Model 2 to identify the effect of 
client importance toward going-concern opi-
nion: 
 
GCO
it 
= 
0 
+ 
1 
CI
it
 + 
2 
SIZE
it
 + 
 3 
PRIORG-
C
it-1
 + 
4 
CASH
it
 + 
5 
LEV
it
 + 
6 
LOSS
it
 + 
7 
LLOSS
it
 +∈ .... Model 2 
 
The statistical form of the hypothesis H
2
 of 
this research is as follows: 
H
2
: 
1 
> 0; the expectation for each control 
variable is:
2 
> 0, 
3 
> 0, 
 4 
< 0, 
 5 
> 0, 
 6 
> 0, 

 7 
> 0. All variables are defined as in Table 2. 
 
The main variable in Model 2 is CI, 
and we estimate the coefficient 
1
 is positive 
and significant toward going-concern opinion 
(GCO), which indicates that client importance 
has a positive association with the propensity 
to issue going-concern opinion. Several con-
trol variables included in the Model 2 to con-
trol other factors that may affect audit firms to 
issue going-concern reports. Companies with 
larger size (SIZE) have greater resources and 
are more likely to survive compared to smaller 
companies (Francis and Yu 2009), therefore 
we predict variable SIZE has a negative asso-
ciation with GCO. Companies that received 
going-concern opinion on the previous year 
(PRIORGC) are more likely to receive going-
concern opinion in the current year (Reynolds 
and Francis, 2001). CASH is a liquidity meas-
ure that is the sum of cash and cash equiva-
lent, scaled by total assets. Companies with 
more liquid assets have more resources to deal 
with financial difficulties, therefore we expect 
CASH coefficient is negative. Companies with 
high debt levels (LEV) and experience net loss 
in the current year (LOSS) are more likely to 
fail and more likely to receive going-concern 
reports, therefore, we predict LEV and LOSS 
coefficients have positive associations with 
GCO (Francis and Yu 2009). 
 
Operational Variables Absolute Discretio-
nary Accruals (ABSDAC) 
We use accrual model from Kothari, Leone 
and Wasley (2005) to measure the discretio-
nary accrual which is as follows: 
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TACC
it
/A
it-1 
=
0
 + 
1 
(1/A
it-1
) + 
1i
REV
it
-
AR
it
/A
it-1
) + 
 2i 
(PP&E
it
/A
it-1
) 
+
1 
ROA
it-1
+∈
1
 ....................... (1) 
 
Discretionary accruals equal the value 
of residual errors ( ) or the difference between 
total accruals and the fitted value of normal 
accruals, defined as DA
it
 = (TACC
it
) - NDA
it 
(Cohen, Dey and Lys 2008)
6
. The absolute 
value of discretionary accrual (ABSDAC) is 
used as a proxy of accrual earnings manage-
ment by considering the possibility of positive 
and negative accrual earnings management 
(Myers, Myers and Omer 2003; Barton and 
Simko 2002; Cohen et al. 2008). All variables 
are defined as in Table 2. 
 
Going-Concern Opinion (GCO) 
GCO is a dummy variable (1; 0), equal to 1 if 
the auditor assumes that the company cannot 
survive within 12 months after the balance 
sheet date, and receive going-concern opinion; 
and 0 if otherwise (Geiger et al. 2005).  
 
Client Importance (CI) 
Client importance (CI) examines the tendency 
of auditors having economic dependence that 
may reduce the auditor independence (e.g., 
Frankel et al. 2002; Craswell et al. 2002; 
Chung and Kallapur 2003; Chen et al. 2010). 
Following Chen et al. (2010), we use natural 
logarithm of total client assets as a proxy of 
economic dependence with the following 
measurements: 
 
 ............................ 2  
 
Where:  
CI
it
 = client importance, as a measure of audit 
firm’s economic dependence toward the client. 
SIZE
it
 = natural logarithm of client’s assets. 
 = the sum of total assets (in natu-
ral logaritm) from n clients of certain audit 
firm. 
 
Control Variables 
We use control variables which have been 
used in the prior research as follows: company 
size (SIZE), cash flow from operation (CFO), 
leverage (LEV), net loss (LOSS), absolute 
value of total accruals (ABSTACC), prior year 
going-concern opinion (PRIORGC), cash and 
cash equivalents (CASH), sales growth 
(SGRW), prior year loss (LLOSS). See Table 
2 for variable definitions. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
The descriptive statistic of all operational va-
riables can be seen on Table 3
7
. The mean of 
ABSDAC in Table 3, Panel A is 0.110 or 
11.0% of the total assets, indicating the mag-
nitude of accrual earnings management. The 
mean of GCO (Panel B) is 0.230 indicating 
that the average firm-years observation to re-
ceive going-concern opinion is 23.0%. The 
mean of CI is 0.239, indicating that the aver-
age proportion of audit firms’ revenue per 
client is 23.9%. In Table 4, CI variable has a 
positive correlation with CGO at a signific-
ance level of 0.01, consistent with our predic-
tion. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables 
Panel A: Model 1 
  
N Minimum  Maximum Mean Std Deviation Skewness 
ABSDAC 
1,080 0.000 2.319 0.110 0.168 5.843 
CI 
1,080 0.018 1.000 0.239 0.309 1.746 
SIZE 
1,080 6.339 18.849 13.574 1.687 0.129 
CFO 
1,080 -1.617 1.082 0.067 0.148 -1.639 
LEV 
1,080 0.000 5.025 0.543 0.512 3.736 
LOSS 
1,080 0.000 1.000 0.170 0.377 1.747 
ABSTACC 
1,080 0.000 2.465 0.101 0.154 6.047 
SGRW 
1,080 -2.418 453.055 0.582 13.79 32.819 
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Table 3  
Panel B: Model 2 
N Minimum  Maximum Mean Std Deviation Skewness 
GCO 
1,053 0.000 1.000 0.230 0.424 1.255 
CI 
1,053 0.018 1.000 0.238 0.308 1.753 
SIZE 
1,053 6.339 18.849 13.590 1.689 0.122 
PRIORGC 
1,053 0.000 1.000 0.320 0.468 0.759 
CASH 
1,053 0.000 0.931 0.100 0.112 2.216 
LEV 
1,053 0.000 5.025 0.532 0.499 3.905 
LOSS 
1,053 0.000 1.000 0.170 0.372 1.805 
LLOSS 
1,053 0.000 1.000 0.190 0.394 1.568 
All variables are defined as in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 4: Pearson Correlations among Variables 
Panel A: Model 1 (n=1,080) 
  ABSDAC CI SIZE CFO LEV LOSS ABSTACC SGRW 
ABSDAC 
1.000               
CI 
0.039 1.000             
SIZE 
-0.128*** -0.333*** 1.000           
CFO 
-0.134*** -0.124*** 0.159*** 1.000         
LEV 
0.247*** 0.134*** -0.197*** -0.184*** 1.000       
LOSS 
0.143*** 0.123*** -0.209*** -0.191*** 0.259*** 1.000     
ABSTACC 
0.914*** 0.040* -0.096*** 0.002 0.253*** 0.183*** 1.000   
SGRW 
0.014 -0.002 -0.022 0.051** -0.034 -0.017 0.033 1.000 
Panel B: Model 2 (n=1,053) 
GCO CI SIZE PRIORGC CASH LEV LOSS LLOSS 
GCO 
1.000               
CI 
0.154*** 1.000             
SIZE 
-0.165*** -0.341*** 1.000           
PRIORGC 
0.797*** 0.130*** -0.161*** 1.000         
CASH 
-0.119*** -0.143*** -0.004 -0.112*** 1.000       
LEV 
0.309*** 0.139*** -0.200*** 0.226*** -0.146*** 1.000     
LOSS 
0.393*** 0.135*** -0.196*** 0.349*** -0.172*** 0.258*** 1.000   
LLOSS 
0.413*** 0.150*** -0.231*** 0.360*** -0.147*** 0.216*** 0.543*** 1.000 
***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 respectively. All variables are defined as in Table 2. 
 
 
Test of Hypothesis 1 (H
1
) 
Hypothesis H
1 
predicts a negative association 
between client importance (CI) and accrual-
based earnings management (ABSDAC). Em-
pirical result of Model 1 in Table 5 has ad-
justed R-square of 85.68% with F-stat 923.766 
(prob < 0.01)
8
. The coefficient of CI (
1
) is -
0.011 (t-stat = -1.303), negative but not signif-
icant at 0.10 with two-tailed test. However, the 
coefficient of CI is negative and significant at 
0.10 with one-tailed test (critical value of t-stat 
= 1.28), consistent with our prediction.  
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Table 5: Regression of the Impact of Client Importance on the  
Accrual-Based Earnings Managemen 
Model 1 
ABSDAC
it
 = 
0 
+ 
1 
CI
it 
+ 
2 
SIZE
it
 + 
3 
CFO
it
 + 
4 
LEV
it
 + 
5 
LOSS
it
 + 
6 
AB-
STACC
it 
+ 
7 
SGRW
it
+ 
it 
Dependent Variable: ABSDAC 
Independent 
Prediction Coefficient t-stat p-value VIF 
Variable 
C ? 0.076*** 2.858 0.004   
CI - - 0.011 -1.303 0.193 1.137 
SIZE -/+ -0.004* -1.916 0.056 1.191 
CFO - -0.164*** -5.813 0.000 1.083 
LEV + -0.001 -0.140 0.888 1.176 
LOSS - -0.026*** -4.110 0.000 1.143 
ABSTACC + 1.006*** 25.743 0.000 1.095 
SGRW + -0.000*** -6.127 0.000 1.006 
Adj R-squared (%)   85.68       
F-statistic   923.766       
Prob (F- statistic)   0.000       
n =1,080      
***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively in two-tailed tests; t-
statistics are calculated using the Huber-White procedure to correct heteroscedas-
ticity. All variables are defined as in Table 2. 
 
 
This result implies that the bigger the 
proportion of the economic dependence of au-
dit firms toward their clients, the smaller the 
magnitude level of accrual earnings manage-
ment. Our result gives interpretation that audit 
firms in Indonesia that have larger clients and 
bigger economic dependence to their clients, 
are less likely to allow earnings management 
behavior. This result is also consistent with 
previous research that found larger offices of 
Big 4 provides higher audit quality and have 
clients with less earnings management beha-
vior (Francis and Yu, 2009). 
Four control variables are significant 
in the expected direction (CFO, LOSS, AB-
STACC, SIZE), and the other control variable 
is not significant at the 0.10 (LEV), or is sig-
nificant in the opposite direction (SGRW). 
 
Test of Hypothesis 2 (H
2
) 
Hypothesis H
2 
predicts a positive association 
between client importance (CI) and going-
concern opinion (GCO). Logistic regression in 
Model 2 (Table 6) has Cox and Snell R-square 
53.70%, and Nagelkerke R-square 80.90% with 
the value of -2Log Likelihood 336.233
9
. The 
result of the test in Model 2 indicates that the 
coefficient of CI (
1
) is 1.218 (Wald test = 
5.923), positive and significant at 0.05 with 
two-tailed test. This result implies that although 
the proportion of audit fee in audit firm’s port-
folio is bigger, audit firms can still maintain 
their independence, measured by the issuance 
of going-concern opinion. Our result is consis-
tent with previous studies, which document that 
larger offices of public accounting firms are 
more likely to issue going-concern opinion, and 
give better prediction for financial distress in the 
upcoming period (e.g., Francis and Yu, 2009).  
Five control variables are significant in 
the expected direction (SIZE, PRIORGC, 
LEV, LOSS, LLOSS) and the other control 
variable is not significant at the 0.10 (CASH). 
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Table 6: Logistic Regression of the Impact of Client Importance toward 
Going-Concern Opinion 
Model 2 
GCO
it
= 
0
 + 
1 
CI
it
 + 
2 
SIZE
it
 + 
3 
PRIORGC
it 
+ 
4 
CASH
it
 + 
5 
LEV
it
 + 
6 
LOSS
it 
+ 
7 
LLOSS
it
 + ∈
it 
Dependent Variable: GCO 
Independent 
Prediction Coefficient Wald p-value 
Variable 
C ? -12.752*** 25.499 0.000 
CI + 1.218** 5.923 0.015 
SIZE + 0.162* 2.743 0.098 
PRIORGC + 9.564*** 28.244 0.000 
CASH - 0.049 0.002 0.969 
LEV + 1.900*** 21.874 0.000 
LOSS + 0.836** 5.164 0.023 
LLOSS + 1.340*** 14.015 0.000 
-2Log Likelihood   336.233     
Cox & Snell R
2 
(%)   53.7     
Nagelkerke R
2 
(%)   80.9     
n =1,053     
***, **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively in two-tailed tests. All va-
riables are defined as in Table 2. 
 
Sensitivity and Robustness Tests 
We use alternate measure of client importance 
(CI), i.e., client’s sales instead of total assets 
to test the robustness of our main results. 
Conversely to the hypothesis result of H
1
, we 
find no evidence of the association between 
client importance (CI) and accrual-based earn-
ings management (ABSDAC) at 0.10 (not ta-
bulated). The usage of client importance mod-
el using total sales as a proxy becomes sensi-
tive and do es not support the main result.  
Sensitivity test for hypothesis H
2 
using 
the same measure of client importance (CI) 
finds similar result as in the main test (Table 
6) (not tabulated). Our result indicates that 
client importance (CI) has a positive associa-
tion with going-concern opinion (GCO) at 
0.05. The usage of the different measure of 
client importance (CI) in Model 2 is robust to 
all alternative test and support the main result. 
This result strengthens our main result and 
previous study (e.g., Francis and Yu 2009), 
which suggest that larger offices of audit firms 
are more likely to issue going-concern opinion 
rather than smaller offices.  
CONCLUSION 
Our study investigates the independence of 
auditors measured by the client importance, 
and reflected in the accrual-based earnings 
management and going-concern opinion. The 
main result of our study finds a negative asso-
ciation between client importance and accrual-
based earnings management. Our evidence 
implies that audit firms with larger clients and 
with more economic dependence to their 
clients are less likely to allow earnings man-
agement behavior. This result is consistent 
with previous studies that suggest that larger 
audit firms, like Big 4 with more expertise and 
ability to detect earnings management beha-
vior are less likely to allow earnings manage-
ment rather than smaller audit firms (Francis 
and Yu 2009; Reynolds and Francis 2001).  
Our second main test finds that client 
importance has a positive association with 
going-concern opinion. This evidence implies 
that although the proportion of client depen-
dence is bigger, public accounting firms can 
maintain their independence measured by the 
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issuance of going-concern opinion. Our result 
is consistent with the previous studies (e.g., 
Reynolds and Francis 2001) and robust to oth-
er sensitivity tests that support the main test 
result. The combine results indicate that client 
importance as a measure of auditor indepen-
dence has a negative association with earnings 
management and has a positive association 
with going-concern opinion.  
This research has some limitations: (i) 
the conclusions drawn in this study should be 
conducted with caution, because we use only 
single measure of auditor independence, i.e., 
the client importance. There are some other 
measurements, such as the influence of client 
practices toward the propensity to meet earn-
ings targets, and corporate governance prac-
tices (Bamber and Bamber 2009); (ii) accrual-
based earnings management is the only meas-
ure of earnings management used in this 
study. Previous research documented several 
other earnings management techniques, such 
as real earnings management, and classifica-
tion shifting (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin 2010; 
Fan et al. 2010). 
We recommend for further study to use 
the composite measure of independence. He-
rusetya (2012) for example, the use composite 
measures of audit quality from the dimension 
of competency and independence. In order to 
reflect the different aspect of earnings man-
agement, we also recommend to examine the 
other tools of earnings management, such as 
real earnings management and classification 
shifting (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Graham et 
al. 2005). 
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1
For example, the Indonesian Government issued a number of regulations concerning the independence and competence of audi-
tors and audit firms, such as: KEP-310/BL/2008 regarding "The Independence of Accountant Providing Services in the Capital 
Markets in 2008”; and The Act No. 5 for the Public Accountants in 2011. 
2
Recent research found that public listed companies not only did accrual-based earnings management, but also real-based transac-
tions (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Chi, Lisic & Pevzner, 2011; Challen and Siregar, 
2011). Other research found other earnings management tools, such as classification shifting (Fan, Barua, Cready & Thomas, 
2010). 

Frankel et al. (2002) found evidence of a positive association between client importance, i.e., the ratio of non-audit services fee 
to total fee and the amount of discretionary accruals. The findings and methodology used by Frankel et al. (2002) were ques-
tioned by many researchers. Chung and Kallapur (2003) for example, found that the association of the ratio of non-audit to total 
fee and absolute abnormal accruals are less robust, because it did not include control variable of each industry.
Francis and Yu (2009) for exception, found no evidence of the association between economic dependence and auditor's going-
concern opinion.
5
 Our sample consist of 53.33% from manufacture industry (basic and chemical industry, consumer goods, and miscellaneous), 
32.59% from trade, service & investment, and 14.07% from property & real estate industry. 
6
 For accrual model used, our study requires a minimum of 15 observations for each type of industry each year (Chi et al., 2011; 
Cohen et al., 2008). 
7
All continuous data are winsorized to avoid outliers using 2 standard deviations from the mean, so that the data is spread over an 
area of 95.45% (Acock, 2008). All variables in Table 3, Panel A and B have low standard deviation except for SGRW. 
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8
 We test for multicollinearity problem and found that all variables have small value of VIF (below 1.50). The tolerance (TOL) 
value of all variables are also close to 1.00, indicating that there are no multicollinearity problem (Gujarati, 2003; Nachrowi and 
Usman, 2006). While the test for heteroscedasticity indicates that there is a problem with heteroscedasticity, but we treat using 
the Huber-White procedure to correct heteroscedasticity in order to get estimated coefficient from robust variance-covariance 
(Wooldridge, 2009). 
9
 We eliminate 27 outliers out of 1080 firm-years observation to obtain robust standard errors. We also test whether there is a 
multicollinearity problem in our empirical model, and found that all independent variables have VIF value below 1.50, indicat-
ing that there is no multicollinearity problem (Gujarati, 2003). Our logistic regression has Chi
2 
= 3.930 (p > 0.10) for Hosmer 
and Lemeshow test, indicating that the data and model used are fit. 
